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Abstract A key exposure problem is unavoidable since it seems human error
can never be eliminated completely, and key-insulated encryption is one of the
cryptographic solutions to the problem. At Asiacrypt’05, Hanaoka et al. intro-
duced hierarchical key-insulation functionality, which is attractive function-
ality that enhances key exposure resistance, and proposed an identity-based
hierarchical key-insulated encryption (hierarchical IKE) scheme in the random
oracle model.
In this paper, we first propose the hierarchical IKE scheme in the standard
model (i.e., without random oracles). Our hierarchical IKE scheme is secure
under the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption, which is a
static assumption. Particularly, in the non-hierarchical case, our construction
is the first IKE scheme that achieves constant-size parameters including public
parameters, secret keys, and ciphertexts.
Furthermore, we also propose the first public-key-based key-insulated en-
cryption (PK-KIE) in the hierarchical setting by using our technique.
Preliminary version appeared in PKC 2016 [31].
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Key-insulated encryption, which is introduced by Dodis et al. [14], is one of
the effective solutions to a key exposure problem. Specifically, they proposed
public-key encryption (PKE) with the key-insulated property, which is called
public-key-based key-insulated encryption (PK-KIE). In PK-KIE, a receiver has
two kinds of secret keys, a decryption key and a helper key. The decryption
key is a short-term key for decrypting ciphertexts, and is periodically updated
by the helper key. More specifically, the lifetime of the system is divided into
discrete time periods, and the receiver can decrypt the ciphertext encrypted
at some time period t by using a decryption key dkt updated by the helper key
at the same time period t. The decryption key and the helper key are stored
in a powerful but insecure device such as laptops and smartphones and in a
physically-secure but computationally-limited device such as USB pen drives,
respectively. Traditionally, in key-insulated cryptography, the following two
kinds of security notions are considered:
(a) If a number of decryption keys {dkt1 , dkt2 , . . . , dktq} are exposed, no infor-
mation on plaintexts encrypted at other time periods is leaked.
(b) Even if a helper key is exposed, the security is not compromised unless at
least one decryption key is exposed.
A key-insulated cryptosystem is said to be secure if it satisfies (a); and to
be strongly secure if it satisfies both (a) and (b). Therefore, key-insulated
encryption can significantly reduce the impact of the exposure, and many
researchers have taken several approaches to realizing secure (in particular,
strongly secure) key-insulated cryptosystems thus far.
Following a seminal work by Dodis et al. [14], many cryptographers have
proposed several kinds of key-insulated cryptographic schemes such as symmetric-
key-based key-insulated encryption [16], key-insulated signatures [15], and par-
allel key-insulated encryption [19,20,24]. In addition to key-insulated cryptog-
raphy, researchers have tackled the key exposure problem in various flavors. In
forward-secure cryptography [1,7], users update their own secret keys at the
beginning of each time period. Forward security requires that an adversary
cannot get any information on plaintexts encrypted at previous time periods
even if the secret key for the current time period is exposed. Intrusion-resilient
cryptography [12,13,22] realizes both key-insulated security and forward se-
curity simultaneously at the expense of efficiency and practicality.
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In this paper, we focus on the key-insulation paradigm in the identity-based
setting. Identity-based encryption (IBE) has been widely studied thus far, and
therefore we believe that the identity-based key-insulated security has a huge
influence on the research on IBE and its applications. Also, developing key-
insulated cryptography in the identity-based area is the first step to consider
the key-insulated security in attribute-based encryption [3,28] and functional
encryption [6], which are expected to be used in cloud environments. However,
in the IBE context, there are only few researches on key-insulation. Hanaoka
et al. [21] introduced a hierarchical key-updating mechanism, and proposed an
IBE scheme with hierarchical key-insulation, which is called an identity-based
hierarchical key-insulated encryption (hierarchical IKE for short) scheme, in
the random oracle model. In their hierarchy, helper keys are assigned to each
level, and decryption keys are assigned to the lowest level. Not only decryption
keys but also helper keys can be updated by a higher-level helper key. Since
this “hierarchy” is not the same as that of hierarchical IBE (HIBE) [18], only
applying techniques used in the HIBE context is insufficient for constructing
secure (in particular, strongly secure) IKE schemes (also see the next subsec-
tion). The hierarchical property is attractive since it enhances resilience to
key exposure and there seem to be various applications due to the progress
in information technology (e.g., the popularization of smartphones). Let us
consider an example of 3-level hierarchical key-insulation in some company:
Suppose that each employee has a business smartphone, a laptop, and a PC
installed at his/her office. A decryption key is stored in the smartphone, and
it is updated by a 1-st level helper key stored in his/her laptop every day.
However, the 1-st level helper key might be leaked since he/she carries around
with the laptop, and connects to the Internet via the laptop. Thus, the 1-st
level helper key is also updated by a 2-nd level helper key stored in his/her
PC every two–three weeks. Since the PC is not completely isolated from the
Internet, his/her boss updates the 2-nd level helper key by a 3-rd level helper
key stored in an isolated private device every two–three months. Thus, we
believe hierarchical IKE has many potential applications.
After the proposal of hierarchical IKE by Hanaoka et al., two (non-hierarchical)
IKE schemes with additional properties in the standard model were proposed.
One is the parallel IKE scheme, which was proposed by Weng et al. [34]. The
other is the threshold IKE scheme, which was proposed by Weng et al. [35].
These two schemes enhance the resistance to helper key exposure by splitting a
helper key into multiple ones. However, once the (divided) helper key is leaked,
the security cannot be recovered. Again, we emphasize that the hierarchical
key-insulated structure is useful since even if some helper key is exposed, it can
be updated. However, there have been no hierarchical IKE schemes without
random oracles thus far.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose an IBE scheme with ℓ-level hierarchical key-insulation,
which is called an ℓ-level hierarchical IKE scheme, such that (1) security is
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proved under simple computational assumptions in the standard model; and
that (2) each size of all parameters including public parameters, secret keys,
and ciphertexts is constant in the non-hierarchical case (i.e., ℓ = 1).
Specifically, the proposed ℓ-level hierarchical IKE scheme is strongly secure
against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA-secure) under the symmetric external
Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption, which is a static and simple assumption.
Our (hierarchical) IKE scheme is based on the Jutla-Roy (H)IBE [23] and its
variant [27]. Further, the proposed scheme achieves the constant-size parame-
ters when ℓ = 1, whereas public parameters of the (non-hierarchical) existing
scheme [35] depend on sizes of identity spaces (also see Section 4.1 for compar-
ison). We can also realize an ℓ-level hierarchical IKE scheme strongly secure
against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA-secure) based on an well-known trans-
formation [5]. Furthermore, we can extend our technique to the public-key
setting. Namely, we formalize public-key encryption with hierarchical key in-
sulation (hierarchical PK-KIE for short), and propose a concrete construction
of a CCA-secure ℓ-level hierarchical PK-KIE scheme.
In the following, we explain why a naive solution is insufficient and why
achieving (1) and (2) is challenging.
Why a (trivial) hierarchical IKE scheme from HIBE is insufficient.1
One may think that a hierarchical IKE scheme can be easily obtained from
an arbitrary HIBE scheme. However, the resulting IKE scheme is insecure in
our security model, which was first formalized in [21], since our security model
captures the strong security notion. More specifically, a trivial construction
is as follows. Let skI be a secret key for some identity I in HIBE, and hk
(ℓ)
I
be an ℓ-th level helper key for I in ℓ-level hierarchical IKE. We set skI as
hk
(ℓ)
I , and lower-level helper keys and decryption keys can be obtained from
skI by regarding time periods as descendants’ identities. However, it is easy
to see that if the ℓ-th level helper key (i.e., skI) is exposed, then an adversary
can obtain all lower-level keys, and thus the resulting scheme does not meet
the strong security. In fact, Bellare and Palacio [2] showed that secure (not
strongly secure) PK-KIE is equivalent to IBE for a similar reason.
Difficulties in constructing a constant-size IKE scheme from sim-
ple computational assumptions. The main difficulty in constructing an
IKE scheme is that an adversary can get various keys for a target identity I∗,
whereas the adversary cannot get a secret key for I∗ in (H)IBE. This point
makes a construction methodology non-trivial. In fact, it seems difficult to
apply the Waters dual-system IBE [33] (and its variant [26]) as the underly-
ing IBE scheme of IKE schemes as follows. Technically, in their scheme each
of secret keys and ciphertexts contains some random element, tagK and tagC ,
respectively. In the dual system encryption methodology, the challenge cipher-
text and secret keys gradually turn into semi-functional forms. The tags are
used in transition from Gk−1 to Gk, where Gk denotes a security game that the
first k secret keys issued to a secret-key extraction oracle are semi-functional.
1 This fact was also mentioned in [21].
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In the transition, some pairwise independent function is embedded into public
parameters in advance to cancel inconvenient values to simulate the games.
The tag tagK of a secret key skIk for k-th identity Ik issued to the oracle
and the tag tagC of the challenge ciphertext C
∗
I∗ for the target identity I
∗
are generated by inputting Ik and I
∗ into the pairwise independent function,
respectively. Although it holds tagK = tagC if Ik = I
∗, the proof works well
since it is enough to generate only tagK for all identities I ̸= I∗ and only tagC
for I∗. However, in the IKE setting, not only tagC but also tagK for I
∗ have
to be generated since an adversary can get leaked decryption keys and helper
keys for I∗, and hence, the proof does not go well. To overcome this challenging
point, we set (the variant of) the Jutla-Roy IBE [23,27], which is another type
of IBE schemes with constant-size public parameters (from simple assump-
tions), as the underlying scheme of our IKE scheme. Thus, we can realize the
first constant-size IKE scheme under the SXDH assumption. Further, we can
also obtain the hierarchical IKE scheme by extending the technique into the
hierarchical setting.
Refinement and improvement from the proceedings version [31]. We
modify our main construction due to a security flaw of the previous construc-
tion in the proceeding version. Specifically, the modified construction provides
a correct simulation of a KI oracle, which is an oracle that captures key expo-
sure, in transition from Gamek−1 to Gamek, where Gamek denotes a security
game in which keys for the first k identities issued to oracles are semi-functional
(for details, see the simulation of the KI oracle in Lemma 2, which shows the
transition).
Moreover, we change the statement of Lemma 3, which is the final tran-
sition in the security proof, to make a reduction clearer. More specifically,
we make a reduction to a computational problem in the lemma, whereas we
made information-theoretic reduction in the proceedings version. Note that
this change does not mean that the previous reduction is wrong.
Further, we newly propose hierarchical PK-KIE, which did not appear in
the proceedings version, by extending our technique.
1.3 Paper Organization
In Section 2, we describe the notation used in this paper, asymmetric pairings,
complexity assumptions, and functions which map time to discrete time peri-
ods. In Section 3, we give a model and security definition of hierarchical IKE.
In Section 4, we propose a direct construction of our hierarchical IKE scheme,
and give the efficiency comparison among our scheme and existing schemes.
In Section 5, we show the security proof of our scheme. In Section 6, we show
a CCA-secure hierarchical IKE scheme. In Section 7, we formalize and propose
a hierarchical PK-KIE scheme. In Section 8, we conclude this paper.
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Fig. 1 Intuition of time-period map functions.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. In this paper, “probabilistic polynomial-time” is abbreviated as
“PPT”. For a prime p, let Zp := {0, 1, . . . , p−1} and Z×p := Zp\{0}. If we write
(y1, y2, . . . , ym)← A(x1, x2, . . . , xn) for an algorithm A having n inputs and m
outputs, it means to input x1, x2, . . . , xn into A and to get the resulting output
y1, y2, . . . , ym. We write (y1, y2, . . . , ym)← AO(x1, x2, . . . , xn) to indicate that
an algorithm A that is allowed to access an oracle O takes x1, x2, . . . , xn as
input and outputs (y1, y2, . . . , ym). If X is a set, we write x
$←X to mean the
operation of picking an element x of X uniformly at random. We use λ as a
security parameter.M and I denote sets of plaintexts and IDs, respectively,
which are determined by a security parameter λ. Throughout this paper, we
consider asymmetric pairings (a detailed explanation is given in Appendix A.)
Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) Assumption. We give the
definition of the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in G1 and G2,
which are called the DDH1 and DDH2 assumptions, respectively.
Let A be a PPT adversary and we consider A’s advantage against the




 b′ = b




if b = 0 then T := gc1c2i ,
else T
$← Gi,
b′ ← A(λ,D, g1, g2, gc1i , g
c2




Definition 1 (DDHi Assumption) The DDHi assumption relative to a gen-
erator G holds if for all PPT adversaries A, AdvDDHiG,A (λ) is negligible in λ.
Definition 2 (SXDH Assumption) We say that the SXDH assumption rel-
ative to a generator G holds if both the DDH1 and DDH2 assumptions relative
to G hold.
Time-period Map Functions. In this paper, we deal with several kinds of
time periods T0, T1, . . . , Tℓ−1 since we consider that update intervals of each
level key are different. For example, in some practical applications, it might be
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suitable that a decryption key (i.e. 0-th level key) and a 1-st level helper key
should be updated every day and every month, respectively. To describe such
different update intervals of each level key, we use a certain functions, which is
called time-period map functions. This functions were also used in [21]. Now,
let T be a (possibly countably infinite) set of time, and Tj (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ−1) be a
finite set of time periods, where 0 /∈ Tj for every j ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ− 1}. We assume
|T0| ≥ |T1| ≥ · · · ≥ |Tℓ−1|. This means that a lower-level key is updated more
frequently than the higher-level keys. Then, we assume there exists a function
Tj (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ − 1) which map time time ∈ T to a time period tj ∈ Tj .
For the understanding of readers, by letting time = 14:00/5th/Jan./2017
and ℓ := 4, we give an example in Figure 1 and below. For example, we
have T0(time) = t
(1)





2 = Jan.-Feb./2018, and T3(time) = t
(1)
3 = Jan.-Jun./2018.
Namely, in this example, it is assumed that the decryption key, and 1-st, 2-nd,
and 3-rd helper keys are updated every half a month, every month, every two
months, and every half a year. Further, we can also define a function Tℓ such
that Tℓ(time) = 0 for all time ∈ T , and let Tℓ = {0}.
3 Identity-based Hierarchical Key-insulated Encryption
3.1 The Model
In an ℓ-level hierarchical IKE, a key generation center (KGC) generates an




I,0 , . . . , hk
(ℓ)
I,0
as a secret key for a user I. Suppose that all time-period map functions
T0, T1, . . . , Tℓ−1 are available to all users. The key-updating procedure when
the user wants to get a decryption key at current time time ∈ T from the ini-
tial helper keys is as follows. The ℓ-th level helper key hk
(ℓ)
I,0 is a long-term one




th level helper key from hk
(ℓ)
I,0 and a time period tℓ−1 := Tℓ−1(time) ∈ Tℓ−1.




, and the user gets the helper key hk
(ℓ−1)
I,tℓ−1
at the time period tℓ−1. Simi-
larly, the i-th level helper key hk
(i)
I,ti at the time period ti := Ti(time) ∈ Ti can




I,ti , where δ
(i)
I,ti is generated from the (i + 1)-th
level helper key hk
(i+1)
I,ti+1 . The user can finally get the decryption key dkI,t0 at
a time period t0 := T0(time) ∈ T0 from the 1-st level helper key hk(1)I,T1(time).
Anyone can encrypt a plaintext M with the identity I and current time time∗,
and the user can decrypt the ciphertext C with his decryption key dkI,t0 if
and only if t0 = T0(time
∗). At time′ ∈ T , the user can update the time period
of the decryption key from any time period t0 to t
′
0 := T0(time
′) ∈ T0 by
using key update δ
(0)
I,T0(time′)
. The key update δ
(0)
I,T0(time′)




if and only if t′1 = T1(time















→ Upd → hk(1)
I,T1(time)




→ Upd → dkI,T0(time)




. In this manner, the decryption and helper keys are updated.
We give the updating procedure of a 2-level hierarchical IKE scheme in Fig. 2.
An ℓ-level hierarchical IKE scheme Πike consists of six-tuple algorithms
(PGen, Gen, ∆-Gen, Upd, Enc, Dec) defined as follows. For simplicity, we omit
a public parameter in the input of all algorithms except for the PGen algorithm.
– (pp,mk)← PGen(λ, ℓ): A probabilistic algorithm for parameter generation.
It takes a security parameter λ and the maximum hierarchy depth ℓ as
input, and outputs a public parameter pp and a master key mk.
– (dkI,0, hk
(1)
I,0 , . . . , hk
(ℓ)
I,0) ← Gen(mk, I): An algorithm for user key genera-
tion. It takes mk and an identity I ∈ I as input, and outputs an initial
secret key dkI,0 associated with I and initial helper keys hk
(1)










or ⊥ ← ∆-Gen(hk(i)I,ti , time): An algorithm for key update
generation. It takes an i-th helper key hk
(i)
I,ti at a time period ti ∈ Ti











I,τi): A probabilistic algorithm for decryption key
generation. It takes an i-th helper key hk
(i)
I,ti at a time period ti ∈ Ti and
key update δ
(i)
I,τi at a time period τ ∈ Ti as input, and outputs a renewal
i-th helper key hk
(i)
I,τi at τ . Note that for any t0 ∈ T0, hk
(0)
I,t0 means dkI,t0 .
– ⟨C, time⟩ ← Enc(I, time,M): A probabilistic algorithm for encryption. It
takes an identity I, current time time, and a plaintext M ∈ M as input,
and outputs a pair of a ciphertext and current time ⟨C, time⟩.
– M or ⊥ ← Dec(dkI,t0 , ⟨C, time⟩): A deterministic algorithm for decryption.
It takes dkI,t0 and ⟨C, time⟩ as input, and outputs M or ⊥, where ⊥
indicates decryption failure.
In the above model, we assume that Πike meets the following correctness
property: For all λ, all ℓ := poly(λ), all (mk, pp) ← PGen(λ, ℓ), all M ∈ M,
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all (dkI,0, hk
(1)
I,0 , . . . , hk
(ℓ)
I,0) ← Gen(mk, I), and all time ∈ T , it holds that
M ← Dec(dkI,T0(time),Enc(I, time,M)), where dkI,T0(time) is generated as fol-







where some ti ∈ Ti. Note that hk(0)I,T0(time) := dkI,T0(time).
3.2 Security Definition
We consider a security notion for indistinguishability against key exposure and
chosen plaintext attack for IKE (IND-KE-CPA). Let A be a PPT adversary,
and A’s advantage against IND-KE-CPA security is defined by
AdvKE-CPAΠike,A (λ, ℓ) :=∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr





∗, time∗, state)← AKG(·),KI(·,·,·)(find, pp),
b
$← {0, 1}, C∗ ← Enc(I∗, time∗,M∗b ),
b′ ← AKG(·),KI(·,·,·)(guess, C∗, state)
− 12
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
where KG(·) and KI (·, ·, ·) are defined as follows.




















) for j = ℓ, . . . , i + 1 (if (dkI,0, hk
(1)
I,0 . . . , hk
(ℓ)
I,0) is
not stored, it first generates and stores them by running Gen).
I∗ is never issued to the KG oracle. A can issue any queries (i, I, time) to the
KI oracle if there exists at least one special level j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ} such that
1. For any time ∈ T , (j, I∗, time) is never issued to KI.
2. For any (i, time) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , j − 1} × T such that Ti(time) = Ti(time∗),
(i, I∗, time) is never issued to KI.
In Figure 3, we give intuition of keys that A can obtain by issuing to the KI
oracle. In this example, let ℓ = 4 and a special level j = 2.
Definition 3 (IND-KE-CPA [21]) An ℓ-level hierarchical IKE scheme Πike is
said to be IND-KE-CPA secure if AdvKE-CPAΠike,A (λ, ℓ) is negligible in λ for all PPT
adversaries A.
Remark 1 As also noted in [21], there is no need to consider key update expo-
sure explicitly (i.e. no need to consider an oracle which returns any key update
as much as possible) since in the above definition, A can get such key update
from helper keys obtained from the KI oracle.
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time*







Fig. 3 Pictorial representation of secret keys for I∗ that A can obtain by issuing to KI.
Remark 2 As explained in Section 1, in key-insulated cryptography including
the public key setting [2,14,19] and the identity-based setting [21,34,35], two
kinds of security notions have been traditionally considered: standard security
and strong security. In most of previous works [2,14,19–21,24,34,35], authors
have considered how their scheme could achieve the strong security. We note
that IND-KE-CPA security actually includes the strong security, and the fact
is easily checked by setting ℓ = 1.
By modifying the above IND-KE-CPA game so that A can access to the
decryption oracle Dec(·, ·), which receives (I, ⟨C, time⟩) and returns M or ⊥,
we can also define indistinguishability against key exposure and chosen cipher-
text attack for IKE (IND-KE-CCA). A is not allowed to issue (I∗, ⟨C∗, time⟩)
such that T0(time) = T0(time
∗) to Dec. Let AdvKE-CCAΠike,A (λ, ℓ) be A’s advantage
against IND-KE-CCA security.
Definition 4 (IND-KE-CCA [21]) An ℓ-level hierarchical IKE scheme Πike is
said to be IND-KE-CCA secure if AdvKE-CCAΠike,A (λ, ℓ) is negligible in λ for all PPT
adversaries A.
4 Our Construction
Our basic idea is a combination of (the variant of) the Jutla-Roy HIBE [23,
27] and threshold secret sharing schemes [4,29]. We prepare two secrets B(x)
and B(y). Each secret B(j) (j ∈ {x, y}) is divided into ℓ shares β(j)0 , . . . , β
(j)
ℓ−1,
and both the secrets and shares are used in exponent of a generator g2 ∈ G2.
B(x) and B(y) are embedded into the exponent of a (first-level) secret key
for I of the Jutla-Roy HIBE, and the resulting key is used as an ℓ-th level
initial helper key hk
(ℓ)
I,0. Roughly speaking, B
(x) and B(y) work as “noises”.
Other initial helper keys hk
(i)









2 ), respectively. As keys are
generated for lower levels, shares are eliminated from the noises B(x) and B(y),
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respectively, and finally the noises are entirely removed when generating (or
updating) a decryption key. Intuitively, since there exists at lease one special
level j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ} in which any secret keys are never exposed, an adversary




i ). Hence, he cannot generate valid decryption
keys that can decrypt the challenge ciphertext for I∗ at time∗.
An ℓ-level hierarchical IKE scheme Πike =(PGen, Gen, ∆-Gen, Upd, Enc,
Dec) is constructed as follows.
- PGen(λ, ℓ): It runs (G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2, e)← G, and chooses x0, y0, {(x1,j ,
y1,j)}ℓj=0, x2, y2, x3, y3
$← Zp and α
$← Z×p , and sets
z = e(g1, g2)
−x0α+y0 , u1,j := g
−x1,jα+y1,j
1 (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ),
w1 := g
−x2α+y2




pp := (g1, g
α













mk := (x0, y0).
- Gen(mk, I): It chooses β
(x)




0 , . . . , β
(y)
ℓ−1, r
$← Zp, and letB(j) :=∑ℓ−1
i=0 β
(j)













































r (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 1), K(x)j := (g
x1,j
2 )













i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1),
hk
(ℓ)













I,ti , time): If ti ̸= Ti(time), it outputs ⊥.


















3 It chooses r̂ ← Zp,
2 This means that initial helper keys hk
(ℓ−1)




I,0 must be updated by hk
(ℓ)
I,0
first and foremost since 0 /∈ Ti for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ− 1}.




i mean empty strings, namely we have hk
(ℓ)
I,0 := (Dy , D
′
y ,
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−r̂ (0 ≤ j ≤ i− 2).
It outputs δ
(i−1)
















































































- Enc(I, time,M): It chooses s, tag
$← Zp. For M ∈ GT , it computes
CM := Mz
s, Cy := g
s
















where tj := Tj(time) (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ−1). It outputs C := (CM , Cy, Cx, CI,time, tag).
- Dec(dkI,t0 , ⟨C, time⟩): If t0 ̸= T0(time), then it outputs⊥. Otherwise, parse








x, D) and (CM , Cy, Cx, CI,time,









We show the correctness of our Πike. Suppose that r denotes internal ran-
domness of hk
(ℓ)
I,0, which are generated when running Gen(mk, I), and r
(j) de-
notes internal randomness of δ
(j−1)
I,I,tj−1 (1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ), which is generated when run-
ning ∆-Gen(hk
(j)

































2 , D := g
r̃
2,












d̂′y , d̂x, d̂
′
x, d̂).
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Table 1 Parameters evaluation of our ℓ-level hierarchical IKE scheme.
G1, G2, and GT are cyclic groups of order p, and |G1|, |G2|, and |GT | denote the bit-
length of a group element in G1, G2, and GT , respectively. |Zp| also denotes the bit-length
of an element in Zp. #pp, #dk, #hkℓ, #hki, and #C denote sizes of public parameters,
decryption keys, ℓ-th level helper keys, i-th level helper keys (1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1), and cipher-
texts, respectively. In computational cost analysis, [·, ·, ·, ·] means the number of [pairing,
multi-exponentiation, regular exponentiation, fixed-based exponentiation]. For comparison
we mention that relative costs for the various operations are as follows: [pairing≈ 5, multi-
exp≈ 1.5, regular-exp:= 1, fixed-based-exp≪ 0.2].
#pp #dk #hkℓ #hki
(ℓ+ 5)|G1|+ (2ℓ+ 7)|G2|+ |GT | 7|G2| 5|G2| (2i+ 7)|G2|
#C Enc. Cost Dec. Cost Assumption
3|G1|+ |GT |+ |Zp| [0, 0, ℓ+ 4, 1] [3, 0, 2, 0] SXDH








x, D) and C = (CM , Cy, Cx,













































We obtain the following theorem. The proof is postponed to Section 5.
Theorem 1 If the SXDH assumption holds, then the resulting ℓ-level hierar-
chical IKE scheme Πike is IND-KE-CPA secure.
4.1 Parameters Evaluation and Comparison
First, we show the parameter sizes and computational costs of our hierarchical
IKE scheme in Table 1.
Also, an efficiency comparison between our IKE scheme and the existing
IKE schemes [21,35] is given in Table 2. In fact, the WLC+08 scheme [35]
has the threshold property and does not have a hierarchical structure, and
therefore, we set the threshold value is one in the WLC+08 scheme and the
hierarchy depth is one in the HHSI05 scheme [21] and our scheme for the fair
comparison. The HHSI05 scheme meets the IND-KE-CCA security, however the
scheme is secure only in the random oracle model (ROM). Both the WLC+08
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Table 2 Efficiency comparison between our construction and existing schemes.
The notation used here is almost the same as that in Table 1. #hk denotes the helper-
key size, and |Gp| denotes the bit-length of a group element in a source group Gp in the
symmetric setting. |M | denotes the bit-length of plaintexts. r is a randomness that depends
on the security parameter, and |r| denotes its bit-length. n denotes the bit-length of identities
in the scheme.
Scheme #pp #dk #hk #C
HHSI05 [21]
(ℓ = 1)
2|Gp| 3|Gp| |Gp| 3|Gp|+ |M |+ |r|
WLC+08 [35] (2n+ 5)|Gp| 4|Gp| 2|Gp| 3|Gp|+ |GT |
Ours (ℓ = 1) 6|G1|+ 9|G2|+ |GT | 7|G2| 5|G2| 3|G1|+ |GT |+ |Zp|
Scheme Enc. Cost Dec. Cost Assumption
HHSI05 [21] (ℓ = 1) [1, 0, 2, 1] [4, 0, 2, 1] CBDH (in ROM)
WLC+08 [35] [0, 1, 3, 1] [3, 0, 0, 0] DBDH
Ours (ℓ = 1) [0, 0, 5, 1] [3, 0, 2, 0] SXDH
scheme and ours meet the IND-KE-CPA security in the standard model (i.e.
without random oracles). Although assumptions behind these schemes (i.e.
the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH), decisional bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (DBDH),5 and SXDH assumptions) are different, they all are static
and simple. We emphasize that the threshold structure does not strengthen
the underlying DBDH assumption of the WLC+08 scheme since the structure
was realized via only threshold secret sharing techniques [4,29]. Note that we
do not take into account the parallel IKE scheme [34] since the model of the
scheme is slightly different from those of the above schemes. However, the
public-parameter size of the parallel IKE scheme also depends on the size of
its identity space, and we mention that this is due to the underlying Waters
IBE [32], not due to the parallel property.
As can be seen, we first achieve the IKE scheme with constant-size param-
eters in the standard model. Again, we also get the first IKE scheme in the
hierarchical setting without random oracles.
5 Proof of Security
We describe how semi-functional ciphertexts and secret keys are generated as
follows.
Semi-functional Ciphertext: Parse a normal ciphertext C as (CM , Cy, Cx, CI,time,
tag). A semi-functional ciphertext C̃ := (C̃M , C̃y, C̃x, C̃I,time, t̃ag) is com-
puted as follows:
C̃M := CMe(g1, g2)
−x0µ = Me(g1, g2)
−x0(αs+µ)+y0s,
5 The formal definitions of the CBDH and DBDH assumptions are given in Appendix A.






































and t̃ag := tag, where µ
$← Z∗p.








































































































2 (0 ≤ j ≤ i− 1),
where ϕ, {ϕj}i−1j=0
$← Zp and γ
$← Z∗p. Note that hk
(0)
I,t0 means dkI,t0 for
any t0 ∈ T0. In particular, h̃k
(0)
I,t0 (= d̃kI,t0) is called a semi-functional
decryption key. We also note that in order to generate the semi-functional
decryption or helper key, g
1
α
2 is needed in addition to the public parameter.
A semi-functional ciphertext can be decrypted with a normal key. This fact











Also, a normal ciphertext can be decrypted with a semi-functional decryption









2 ) = 1.
A helper or decryption key obtained by running the ∆-Gen and Upd algo-
rithms with a semi-functional helper key is also semi-functional.
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Proof (of Theorem 1) Based on [23,27], we prove the theorem through a se-
quence of games. We first define the following games:
GameReal: This is the same as the IND-KE-CPA game described in Section 3.
Game0: This is the same as GameReal except that the challenge ciphertext is
semi-functional.
Gamek (1 ≤ k ≤ q): This is the same as Game0 except for the following mod-
ification: Let q be the maximum number of identities issued to the KG or
KI oracles, and Ii (1 ≤ i ≤ q) be an i-th identity issued to the oracles.
If queries regarding the first k identities Iy, . . . , Ik are issued, then semi-
functional decryption and/or helper keys are returned. The rest of keys
(i.e., keys regarding Ik+1, . . . , Iq) are normal.
GameFinal: This is the same as Gameq except that the challenge ciphertext is
a semi-functional one of a random element of GT .
Let SReal, Sk (0 ≤ k ≤ q), and SFinal be the probabilities that the event b′ = b
occurs in GameReal, Gamek, and GameFinal, respectively. Then, we have
AdvKE-CPAΠike,A (λ, ℓ) ≤ |SReal − S0|+
q∑
i=1




The rest of the proof follows from the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 If the DDH1 assumption holds, then it holds that |SReal − S0| ≤
2AdvDDH1G,B (λ).
Proof At the beginning, a PPT adversary B receives an instance (g1, gc11 , g
c2
1 ,
g2, T ) of the DDH1 problem. Then, B randomly chooses x0, y0, {(x1,j , y1,j)}ℓj=0,
x2, y2, x3, y3
$← Zp, and creates
z := e(gc11 , g2)
−x0e(g1, g2)


























to A. Note that B knows a master key mk := (x0, y0) and we implicitly set
α := c1.
B can simulate the KG and KI oracles since B knows the master key.
In the challenge phase, B receives (M∗0 ,M∗1 , I∗, time∗) from A. B chooses
d
























B sends C∗ := (C∗M , C∗y , C∗x, C∗I,time, tag∗) to A.
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If b = 0, then the above ciphertext is normal by setting s := c2. If b = 1,










































After receiving d′ from A, B sends b′ = 1 to the challenger of the DDH1
problem if d′ = d.
Otherwise, B sends b′ = 0 to the challenger.
Lemma 2 For every k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q}, if the DDH2 assumption holds, then it
holds that |Sk−1 − Sk| ≤ 2AdvDDH2G,B (λ).
Proof At the beginning, a PPT adversary B receives an instance (g1, g2, gc12 , g
c2
2 ,








$← Zp and α















, y2 := c2, x3 :=
x′3 + y3
α






z := e(g1, g2)
−x′0 , u1,j := g
−x′1,j
1 (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ), w1 := g
−x′2



























































to A. Note that B knows a master key mk := (x0, y0).
We show how B simulates the KG and KI oracles. Let Ii (1 ≤ i ≤ q) be an
i-th identity issued to the oracles. Without loss of generality, we consider A
issues all identities Ii ̸= I∗ to the KG oracle, and issues only queries regarding
I∗ to the KI oracle.
KG oracle. B creates k − 1 semi-functional decryption and helper keys, and
embeds T into the k-th keys. The rest of keys are normal.
Case i < k: After receiving Ii, B creates and returns semi-functional keys.
Since B knows the master key and α, B can create both normal and semi-
functional keys.
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Case i = k: After receiving Ik, B creates semi functional keys by embedding T




0 , . . . , β
(x)
ℓ−1


























































































α (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 1).





















j=0). If b = 0, then it is easy to see that
the above keys are normal by setting r := c1. If b = 1, then the above
ciphertext is semi-functional since it holds












































































































































































2 (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 1),
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3 , and ϕj := y
′′
1,j (0 ≤ j ≤
ℓ−1). Since y′′1,j and y′′3 are chosen uniformly at random, ϕ and ϕj are also
uniformly distributed.
Case i > k: After receiving Ii, B creates and returns normal keys by using the
master key.
KI oracle. We can simulate the KI oracle as in the KG oracle except for the
case Ik = I
∗. Therefore, in the following we suppose that A issues k − 1
identities Iy, . . . , Ik−1 to the KG oracle, and then issues a query (i, I
∗, time)
(i.e., Ik = I
∗) to the KI oracle. Note that there exists a special level j ∈
{0, . . . , ℓ}, and A cannot issue (i, I∗, time) such that Ti(time) = Ti(time∗)
and i < j. We also note that B does not need to know which level would be
the special one in advance.
For a query (i, I∗, time), B creates and stores decryption and helper keys
(dkI∗,0, hk
(1)
I∗,0, . . . , hk
(ℓ)














for k = ℓ, . . . , i+1, where tℓ := 0 and tk := Tk(time) (i ≤ k ≤ ℓ−1). B returns
hk
(i)
I∗,ti to A. Note that from the second query for I
∗, B answers queries by
using the stored keys.
It is obvious that the returned key is an well-formed normal key if b = 0. We
show that the returned key is semi-functional if b = 1. Since (dkI∗,0, hk
(1)
I∗,0, . . . ,
hk
(ℓ)















































































































































































2 (0 ≤ k ≤ i− 1),
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where γ comes from T = gc1c2+γ2 , r̂ is randomness due to the re-randomization








and ϕj := y
′′
1,k (i− 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ− 1).
The above simulation works well for a query (i, I∗, time) such that Ti(time)
̸= Ti(time∗) since ϕ and ϕj are uniformly distributed from the A’s viewpoint.
However, we have to pay attention to a query (i, I∗, time) such that i > j and
Ti(time) = Ti(time
∗), and we show that the above simulation works well even
for such a query.
Suppose that A receives hkI∗,Ti(time) for a query (i, I∗, time) such that
i > j and Ti(time) = Ti(time
















from hkI∗,Ti(time), where t
∗
0 = T0(time









x, D) is a correct decryption key for I
∗ and t∗0. Namely, A can













3 . This is equivalent to t̃ag
∗
, which is randomness for a chal-
lenge ciphertext and will be defined in the challenge phase. Therefore, ϕ is not
uniformly distributed from the viewpoint ofA, and the proof seem to fail. How-
ever, the simulation actually works well since we can observe the above simu-















j , and χ are uniformly chosen elements from Zp. The above













j ). Therefore, ϕ is uniformly distributed from the viewpoint of A since
A never knows the values of j-th level noises. In other words, A cannot dis-
tinguish the following two in the information-theoretic sense: The noises are
(β′
(y)









j ) and the semi-functional randomness is ϕ+ χ.
In the challenge phase, B receives (M∗0 ,M∗1 , I∗, time∗) from A. B chooses
d
$← {0, 1}, and sets t∗j := Tj(time∗) (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ − 1). However, B cannot
create the semi-functional ciphertext for I∗ without knowledge of c2 (and
hence y1,j (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ) and y3). To generate the semi-functional ciphertext








1,j)− I∗y′′1,ℓ − y′′3 .




3 are chosen uniformly at random, probability distri-
bution of t̃ag
∗
is also uniformly at random from A’s view. More specifically, if
Ik ̸= I∗, then ϕ and t̃ag
∗
are pairwise independent. If Ik = I
∗, ϕ and t̃ag
∗
are
independent due to χ. Then, B chooses s $← Zp and µ





−x0µ = M∗d e(g1, g2)
−x0(αs+µ)+y0s,

























































































































B sends C̃∗ := (C̃∗M , C̃∗y , C̃∗x, C̃∗I,time, t̃ag
∗
) to A.
After receiving d′ from A, B sends b′ = 1 to the challenger of the DDH2
problem if d′ = d. Otherwise, B sends b′ = 0 to the challenger.
Lemma 3 |Sq − SFinal| ≤ 2AdvDDH1G,B (λ).
Proof At the beginning, a PPT adversary B receives an instance (g1, gc11 , g
c2
1 , g2,
T ) of the DDH1 problem. Then, B randomly chooses {(x1,j , y′1,j)}ℓj=0, x2, y′2, x3,
y′3
$← Zp and α
$← Z∗p, and (implicitly) sets
x0 := c1, y0 := x0α+ y
′
0, y1,j := x1,jα+ y
′
1,j (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ),
y2 := x2α+ y
′




z := e(g1, g2)
y′0 , u1,j := g
y′1,j
1 (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ), w1 := g
y′2
1 , h1 := g
y′3
1 .













to A. Note that B does not know a master key mk := (x0, y0).
KG oracle. When receiving I fromA, B first generates (initial) semi-functional




0 , . . . , β
(x)
ℓ−1, r, ϕ

















γ , and ϕj :=
α(ϕ′j−rx1,j)
γ (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 1). It then holds




j = rx1,j +
γϕj






2 (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 1),
























































2 (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 1).








j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 1),
and hk
(ℓ)











KI oracle. Without loss of generality, we fix any j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ} as a special
level, and suppose that B receives a query (i, I∗, time) such that i ̸= j and
Ti(time) ̸= Ti(time∗) if i < j, where I∗ and time∗ are the target identity and
target time, respectively. Then, B can generate initial semi-functional keys for
I∗ as in the KG oracle. Therefore, B can return any i-th semi-functional key
for I∗ at time.
In the challenge phase, B receives (M∗0 ,M∗1 , I∗, time∗) from A. B chooses
d
$← {0, 1}. B chooses s, tag∗ $← Zp and computes
C̃∗M := M
∗
d · e(g1, g2)y
′
0se(T, g2)


























B sends C∗ := (C̃∗M , C̃∗y , C̃∗x, C̃∗I,time, tag∗) to A.
If b = 0, then the above ciphertext is a semi-functional one of M∗d by
setting µ := c2. If b = 1, then the above ciphertext is a semi-functional one of
a random element of GT since it holds
C̃∗M = M
∗
d · e(g1, g2)y
′
0s−x0µ−η
= M∗d · e(g1, g2)−x0αs+y0s−x0µ−η
= M∗d · e(g1, g2)−x0(αs+µ)+y0se(g1, g2)−η
= R · e(g1, g2)−x0(αs+µ)+y0s,
where R = M∗d · e(g1, g2)−η.
After receiving d′ from A, B sends b′ = 1 to the challenger of the DDH1
problem if d′ = d. Otherwise, B sends b′ = 0 to the challenger.
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Proof of Theorem 1. From Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, we have
AdvKE-CPAΠike,A (λ, ℓ) ≤ |SReal − S0|+
q∑
i=1




≤ 4AdvDDH1G,B (λ) + 2q ·AdvDDH2G,B (λ).
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed. ⊓⊔
6 Chosen-Ciphertext Security
Boneh et al. [5] proposed an well-known transformation from (ℓ+1)-level CPA-
secure HIBE (and one-time signature (OTS)) to ℓ-level CCA-secure HIBE. We
cannot apply this transformation to a hierarchical IKE scheme in a generic way
since it does not have delegating functionality. However, we can apply their
techniques to the underlying Jutla-Roy HIBE of our hierarchical IKE, and
therefore we obtain a CCA-secure scheme. We show the detailed construction
as follows. We assume a verification key vk is appropriately encoded as an
element of Zp when it is used in exponent of ciphertexts.
Let Πots = (KGen,Sign,Ver) be an OTS scheme.
6 An ℓ-level hierarchi-
cal IKE scheme Πike =(PGen, Gen, ∆-Gen, Upd, Enc, Dec) is constructed as
follows.
- PGen(λ, ℓ): It runs (G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2, e) ← G. It chooses x0, y0, {(x1,j ,
y1,j)}ℓj=0, x̂1, ŷ1, x2, y2, x3, y3
$← Zp and α
$← Z×p , and sets
z = e(g1, g2)
−x0α+y0 , u1,j := g
−x1,jα+y1,j
1 (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ),
û1 := g
−x̂1α+ŷ1
1 , w1 := g
−x2α+y2




pp := (g1, g
α
















mk := (x0, y0).
- Gen(mk, ID): It chooses β
(x)




0 , . . . , β
(y)
ℓ−1, r
$← Zp, and letB(j) :=∑ℓ−1
i=0 β
(j)







































6 The formal description of the OTS is given in Appendix A.







r (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 1), K(x)j := (g
x1,j
2 )




















i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1),
hk
(ℓ)









































































































































































































- Enc(I, time,M): It first runs (vk, sk)← KGen(λ). It chooses s, tag $← Zp.
For M ∈ GT , it computes
CM := Mz
s, Cy := g
s


















where tj := Tj(time) (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ − 1). It also runs σ ← Sign(sk, (CM , Cy,
Cx, CI,time, tag)), and outputs C := (vk, CM , Cy, Cx, CI,time, tag, σ).
- Dec(dkI,t0 , ⟨C, time⟩): If t0 ̸= T0(time), then it outputs⊥. Otherwise, parse










vk) and (vk, CM , Cy,
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Cx, CI,time, tag, σ), respectively. If Ver(vk, CM , Cy, Cx, CI,time, tag, σ)→ 0,



















The correctness of the above IKE scheme Πike can be checked as in our CPA-
secure IKE scheme described in Section 4.
For the security of our construction above, we obtain the following theorem.
The proof is omitted since this theorem can be easily proved by combining
Boneh et al.’s techniques [5] and our proof techniques of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 If the underlying OTS scheme Πots is sUF-OT secure and the
SXDH assumption holds, then the resulting ℓ-level hierarchical IKE scheme
Πike is IND-KE-CCA secure.
7 Public-key Encryption with Hierarchical Key Insulation
In this section, we consider the hierarchical key insulation structure in the
public-key-encryption setting. Specifically, we newly formalize ℓ-level hierarchi-
cal public-key-based key-insulated encryption (PK-KIE), and propose a con-
crete construction for it. This proposal is the first realization of PK-KIE in
the hierarchical setting.
7.1 Model and Security Definition
ℓ-level hierarchical PK-KIE takes almost the same procedure as ℓ-level hi-
erarchical IKE. A receiver generates a public key pk and initial secret keys
dk0, hk
(1)
0 , . . . , hk
(ℓ)
0 , where dk0 is an initial decryption key and hk
(i)
0 is an ini-
tial i-th helper key. Each helper key is stored in different devices. A sender
encrypts a plaintext M with the public key pk and current time time. The
key-updating procedure is the same as that in ℓ-level hierarchical IKE. Af-
ter receiving ⟨C, time⟩, the receiver can decrypt a ciphertext C with dkt0 if
t0 = T0(time).
An ℓ-level hierarchical PK-KIE scheme Πpkie consists of five-tuple algo-
rithms (Setup, ∆-Gen, Upd, Enc, Dec) defined as follows.
– (pk, dk0, hk
(1)
0 , . . . , hk
(ℓ)
0 ) ← Setup(λ, ℓ): An algorithm for key generation.
It takes a security parameter λ and the maximum hierarchy depth ℓ as
input, and outputs a public key pk, an initial secret key dk0, and initial
helper keys hk
(1)
0 , . . . , hk
(ℓ)
0 , where hk
(i)
0 (1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ) is assumed to be stored
user’s i-th level private device.




or ⊥ ← ∆-Gen(hk(i)ti , time): An algorithm for key update gen-
eration. It takes an i-th helper key hk
(i)
ti at a time period ti ∈ Ti and current
time time as input, and outputs key update δ
(i−1)
I,Ti−1(time)
if ti = Ti(time);







I,τi): A probabilistic algorithm for decryption key gen-
eration. It takes an i-th helper key hk
(i)
ti at a time period ti ∈ Ti and key
update δ
(i)
I,τi at a time period τ ∈ Ti as input, and outputs a renewal i-th
helper key hk
(i)
τi at τ . Note that for any t0 ∈ T0, hk
(0)
t0 means dkt0 .
– ⟨C, time⟩ ← Enc(pk, time,M): A probabilistic algorithm for encryption. It
takes a public key pk, current time time, and a plaintext M ∈M as input,
and outputs a pair of a ciphertext and current time ⟨C, time⟩.
– M or ⊥ ← Dec(dkt0 , ⟨C, time⟩): A deterministic algorithm for decryption.
It takes dkt0 and ⟨C, time⟩ as input, and outputsM or⊥, where⊥ indicates
decryption failure.
In the above model, we assume thatΠpkie meets the following correctness prop-
erty: For all λ, all ℓ := poly(λ), all (pk, dk0, hk
(1)
0 , . . . , hk
(ℓ)
0 )← Setup(λ, ℓ), all
M ∈M, and all time ∈ T , it holds thatM ← Dec(dkT0(time), Enc(pk, time,M)),









, time)), where some ti ∈ Ti. Note that hk(0)T0(time) :=
dkT0(time).
We consider the strong security for (hierarchical) PK-KIE, i.e., indistin-
guishability against key exposure and chosen ciphertext attack for PK-KIE
(IND-KE-CCA). LetA be a PPT adversary, andA’s advantage against IND-KE-CCA
security is defined by
AdvKE-CCAΠpkie,A (λ, ℓ) :=∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
 b′ = b
(pk, dk0, hk
(1)
0 , . . . , hk
(ℓ)




∗, state)← AKI(·,·),Dec(·)(find, pk),
b
$← {0, 1}, C∗ ← Enc(pk, time∗,M∗b ),
b′ ← AKI(·,·),Dec(·)(guess, C∗, state)
− 12
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
where KI (·, ·) and Dec(·) are defined as follows.











) for j = ℓ, . . . , i+ 1.
Dec(·): For a query ⟨C, time⟩, it returns Dec(dkT0(time), ⟨C, time⟩).
A can issue any queries (i, time) to the KI oracle if there exists at least one
special level j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ} such that
1. For any time ∈ T , (j, time) is never issued to KI.
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2. (i, time) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , j − 1} × T such that Ti(time) = Ti(time∗) is never
issued to KI.
A is not allowed to issue ⟨C∗, time⟩ such that T0(time) = T0(time∗) to Dec.
Definition 5 (IND-KE-CCA) An ℓ-level hierarchical PK-KIE scheme Πpkie is
said to be IND-KE-CCA secure if AdvKE-CCAΠpkie,A (λ, ℓ) is negligible in λ for all PPT
adversaries A.
Remark 3 The above security definition captures strong security. In particular,
the above definition is equivalent to traditonal definition of PK-KIE [2,14]
when ℓ = 1.
7.2 Construction
We construct an ℓ-level hierarcical PK-KIE scheme based on our CPA-secure
hierarchical IKE construction and an well-known transformation from any
CPA-secure IBE scheme and any OTS scheme to a CCA-secure PKE scheme [5,
8]. Therefore, this construction is similar to a CCA-secure hierarchical IKE
construction proposed in Section 6. The main difference between them is that
in this construction, the master key of the Jutla-Roy HIBE scheme is used as
an ℓ-th level helper key as in the existing construction of PK-KIE from an IBE
scheme [2], whereas it is used as the master key in the CCA-secure hierarchical
IKE construction.
An ℓ-level hierarchical PK-KIE scheme Πpkie =(Setup, ∆-Gen, Upd, Enc,
Dec) is constructed as follows.
- Setup(λ, ℓ): It runs (G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2, e) ← G. It chooses x0, y0, {(x1,j ,
y1,j)}ℓ−1j=0, x̂1, ŷ1, x2, y2, x3, y3,
$← Zp and α
$← Z×p , and sets
z = e(g1, g2)
−x0α+y0 , u1,j := g
−x1,jα+y1,j
1 (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 1),
û1 := g
−x̂1α+ŷ1
1 , w1 := g
−x2α+y2











































2 (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 1).
It outputs
pk := (g1, g
α
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- ∆-Gen(hk
(i)
ti , time): If ti ̸= Ti(time), it outputs ⊥.



















































































































































































- Enc(pk, time,M): It chooses s, tag
$← Zp, and runs (vk, sk) ← KGen(λ).
For M ∈ GT , it computes
CM := Mz
s, Cy := g
s
















where tj := Tj(time) (0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ − 1). It runs σ ← Sign(sk, (CM , Cy, Cx,
Ctime, tag)), and outputs C := (vk, CM , Cy, Cx, Ctime, tag, σ).
- Dec(dkt0 , ⟨C, time⟩): If t0 ̸= T0(time), then it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, parse










vk) and (CM , Cy, Cx,
Ctime, tag), respectively. If Ver(vk, CM , Cy, Cx, Ctime, tag, σ) → 0, then it



















7 This means that initial helper keys hk
(ℓ−1)




0 must be updated by hk
(ℓ)
0
first and foremost since 0 /∈ Ti for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ− 1}.






j=0 mean empty strings, and we
consider these as identity elements in G2 when these elements are used in operations.








(d̂y , . . . , d̂5, k̂vk, k̂
′
vk).
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Table 3 Parameters evaluation of our ℓ-level hierarchical PK-KIE scheme.
#pk, #hk(ℓ), #hk(i), #dk, and #C denote the sizes of public keys, ℓ-th level helper keys,
i-th level helper keys (0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ−1), decryption keys, and ciphertexts. k denotes the number
of allowable leaked decryption keys in the scheme.
#pk #dk #hkℓ #hki
(ℓ+ 5)|G1|+ (2ℓ+ 5)|G2|+ |GT | 7|G2| 2|G2| (2i+ 9)|G2|
#C Enc. Cost Dec. Cost Assumption
3|G1|+ |GT |+ |Zp| [0, 0, ℓ+ 5, 1] [3, 0, 2, 0] SXDH
We can easily check the correctness in a way similar to our hierarchical
IKE scheme.
For the security of the above construction, we obtain the following theorem.
This theorem can be also easily proved by combining existing techniques [5,8]
and our proof techniques of Theorem 1. Therefore, we omit the proof.
Theorem 3 If the SXDH assumption holds and Πots is sUF-OT secure, then
the resulting ℓ-level hierarchical PK-KIE scheme Πpkie is IND-KE-CCA secure.
7.3 Parameter Evaluation and Discussion
We give a parameter evaluation of our scheme in Table 3. Again, the proposed
construction is the first PK-KIE scheme in the hierarchical setting.
We compare our scheme in the non-hierarchical case with existing PK-
KIE schemes. Dodis et al. [14] (strongly) CCA-secure (non-hierarchical) PK-
KIE scheme under decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Namely, this
scheme can be realized without pairings, though it does not satisfy optimal
threshold property, which means that the scheme is secure even if any polyno-
mially many decryption keys are leaked. As a result, the number of allowable
leaked decryption keys q has to be determined in the setup algorithm of their
scheme, and its parameter sizes depend on q. On the other hand, our scheme
satisfies the optimal threshold property, and achieves constant-size parameters
when ℓ = 1. Bellare and Palacio [2] showed a generic transformation from any
CCA-secure IBE scheme to CCA-secure PK-KIE scheme. However, the result-
ing scheme does not meet strong security. Cheon et al. [11] showed a generic
transformation from any timed-release encryption (TRE) scheme to strongly
CCA-secure PK-KIE scheme. However, the resulting scheme seems less effi-
cient than ours since the currently-known, most efficient construction of TRE
scheme [25] needs a CPA-secure identity-based key-encapsulation system, a
CCA-secure PKE scheme, and an OTS scheme, whereas our scheme is based
on a specific CPA-secure IBE scheme (i.e., the Jutla-Roy IBE) and an OTS
scheme.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we first proposed an ℓ-level hierarchical key-insulated encryption
without random oracles in both the identity-based and public-key setting.
When ℓ = 1, our construction achieves constant-size parameters including
public parameters, decryption and helper keys, and ciphertexts, and hence
our IKE scheme is more efficient than the existing scheme [35] in the sense of
parameter sizes. Our IKE scheme is based on the Jutla-Roy HIBE [23] (and
its variant [27]) and techniques of threshold secret sharing schemes [4,29].
Recently, the Jutla-Roy IBE is beginning to attract attention [30,10] due to
its useful property (re-randomizability, etc.), and we expect that the Jutla-Roy
IBE has untapped potential and more applications. Furthermore, we realized
a hierarchical PK-KIE scheme based on our hierarchical IKE construction
through the transformation techniques [5,8].
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A Omitted Descriptions
Bilinear Group. A bilinear group generator G is an algorithm that takes a security param-
eter λ as input and outputs a bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e), where p is a prime, G1,
G2, and GT are multiplicative cyclic groups of order p, g1 and g2 are (random) generators of
G1 and G2, respectively, and e is an efficiently computable and non-degenerate bilinear map
e : G1 × G2 → GT with the following bilinear property: For any u, u′ ∈ G1 and v, v′ ∈ G2,
e(uu′, v) = e(u, v)e(u′, v) and e(u, vv′) = e(u, v)e(u, v′).
A bilinear map e is called symmetric or a “Type-1” pairing if G1 = G2. Otherwise, it is
called asymmetric. In the asymmetric setting, e is called a “Type-2” pairing if there is an
efficiently computable isomorphism either from G1 to G2 or from G2 to G1. If no efficiently
computable isomorphisms are known, then it is called a “Type-3” pairing. In this paper, we
focus on the Type-3 pairing, which is the most efficient setting in terms of group sizes (of
G1) and operations. For details, see [9,17].
We next give formal definitions the CBDH and DBDH assumptions as follows. In the
following, we assume the Type-1 pairing (i.e., G := G1 = G2).
Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) Assumption. Let A be a PPT ad-
versary and we consider A’s advantage against the CBDH problem as follows.
AdvCBDHG,A (λ) := Pr
 T = e(g, g)c1c2c3 (p,G,GT , g, e)← G,c1, c2, c3 $← Zp,
T ← A(λ, g, gc1 , gc2 , gc3 )
 .
Definition 6 The CBDH assumption relative to a generator G holds if for all PPT adver-
saries A, AdvCBDHG,A (λ) is negligible in λ.
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption. Let A be a PPT adversary











if b = 1 then W := ê(g, g)c1c2c3 ,
else W
$← GT ,
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Definition 7 The DBDH assumption relative to a generator G holds if for all PPT adver-
saries A, AdvDBDHG,A (λ) is negligible in λ.
Finally, we describe the definition of OTS as follows.
One-time signature. An OTS scheme Πots consists of three-tuple algorithms (KGen, Sign,
Ver) defined as follows.
– (vk, sk)← KGen(λ): It takes a security parameter λ and outputs a pair of a public key
and a secret key (vk, sk).
– σ ← Sign(sk,m): It takes the secret key sk and a message m ∈ M and outputs a
signature σ.
– 1 or 0← Ver(vk,m, σ): It takes the public key vk and a pair of a message and a signature
(m,σ), and then outputs 1 or 0.
We assume that Πots meets the following correctness property: For all security parameters
λ ∈ N, all (vk, sk)← KGen(λ), and all m ∈M, it holds that 1← Ver(vk, (m, Sign(sk,m))).
We describe the notion of strong unforgeability against one-time attack (sUF-OT). Let
A be a PPT adversary, and A’s advantage against sUF-OT security is defined by
AdvsUF-OTΠots,A(λ) := Pr
[




Sign(·) is a signing oracle which takes a message m as input, and then returns σ by running
Sign(sk,m). A is allowed to access to the above oracle only once.
Definition 8 An OTS scheme Πots is said to be sUF-OT secure if for all PPT adversaries
A, AdvsUF-OTΠots,A(λ) is negligible in λ.
